Redefining Populism and the Creation of Social Conservatism

A CULTURE OF DEFIANCE: History of the Reform-Conservative Party of Canada

"The best laid plans of mice and men go oft astray." - Robert Burns

By the 1960s Ernest Manning had become increasingly concerned that Canada was threatened with economic and moral ruin, which he attributed to the rise of socialism. And while he felt that Social Credit principles were the only thing that could save the country, the SoCon party was in disarray, now attracting only those from the right-wing fringes.

And it was this moral and economic decay that prompted him to co-write with his son Preston, Political Realignment, which would combine free enterprise with social concerns. The book was a blueprint for what Manning called 'social conservatism.'

Funding for it's creation came from a newly formed organization, known as the National Public Affairs Research Foundation (NPARF), where Preston was engaged as a 'policy researcher.'

A report by columnist Don Sellar in the Calgary Herald on 21 July 1967 described the NPARF as a somewhat secretive, staunchly right-wing, lobby group funded by several prominent businessmen, including R.A. Brown, president of Home Oil, Cyrus McLean, chairman of B.C. Telephone, Renault St Laurent, lawyer and son of the former prime minister, Ronald Clarke, an Edmonton architect, R.J. Burns, a Calgary lawyer, and A.M. Shoults, president of James Lovick Ltd. of Toronto, all of whom were close friends of the elder Manning." (1)

Besides Realignment, Preston Manning also helped to create the White paper, a social engineering plan that focused on the sovereignty of the individual, to combat what they saw as the threat of collectivism (socialism) that had become quickly accelerated with the introduction of public health care.

Human resources will be treated as being intrinsically more important than physical resources.

Prior consideration will be given to human beings individually (persons), rather than to human beings collectively (society).

Changes and adjustments to changes will be proposed, but these will always be related to fundamental principles.

A free enterprise economy, in which all individuals have maximum opportunity to participate, will be regarded as more desirable than a state regimented economy.

A supporting function, rather than a domineering function, will be ascribed to the state relative to resources development." (1)

And they attempted through NPARF to join the Social Credit and Progressive Conservative parties of Alberta, with aspirations of eventually creating a national party.

Manning's second project with the NPARF was 'an investigation of the possibility of putting together the aging Social Credit Party of Alberta ... with the up-and-coming Progressive Conservative Party of Alberta under its new leader, Peter Lougheed." Erick Schmidt and Preston Manning met with Lougheed's group, represented by Joe Clark and Mery Leitch (later energy minister in the Lougheed cabinet), on several occasions, and eventually produced a draft plan for amalgamating the two parties under the banner of the Social Conservative party. The idea was quickly rejected, however, by officials both within the Manning government and the Lougheed camp." (1)

Joe Clark had a history with both Preston and Social Credit.

Nonetheless, the idea of a realignment of right-wing forces stayed with the Mannings ... The book [Political Realignment: A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians], written in the same style as the White Paper, expressed Ernest Manning's contention that real political choice had disappeared from the federal Canadian scene because the parties —particularly the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives — were not ideologically distinct. Hence, Ernest Manning proposed that political choice be re-established through a realignment/ polarization of political thinking and organization. The end product of such a political realignment would be social conservatism, an ideology that Manning defined as welding 'the humanitarian concerns of those with awakened social consciences to the economic persuasions of those with a firm conviction in the value of freedom of economic activity and enlightened private enterprise. (1)

But the time wasn't right and the proposal not realistic. There had been a lot of social change as a result of the Civil Rights Movement and a search for a more open and just society. This was Trudeau's time.

The problem with Ernest and Preston Manning was that they had almost cut themselves off from the real world. Ernest rarely spoke to his constituents except through his radio Bible program. When Preston attended school, he had to go to his father's office where he did his homework before the two headed to their house.

When he attended university, it was understood that he avoid relationships, except with those who thought as he did. Not a large group.

So their political thought was out of step with modern society.

In many ways, this semi-isolation, also created Stephen Harper's narrow minded thinking. Growing up in what his biographer, William Johnson, referred to as the "quintessential WASP middle-class suburb."

His childhood was spent with mostly white middle-class protestants in a pre-designed community with little "through traffic"

The End of Social Credit

Manning stepped down as Premier in 1968, as the party was losing steam. The reins would be passed to Peter Lougheed and his PCs. In September of 1979, the Camrose radio station, CFCN - the station on which Aberhart had begun broadcasting 'The Back to the Bible Hour' in 1925 — announced that it was dumping the show because of low ratings.

Federally, Joe Clark won the 1979 election for the Tories, only to lose power a few months later, giving Trudeau another mandate. Many blame Clark's obstinance in not joining with the stronger Quebec branch of the Social Credit movement: The Creditistes, led by Fabien Roy.

Had he done that, his minority government would not have fallen. According to Peter Brimelow:

Tory Prime Minister Joe Clark's government was in a minority and could have used Creditistes support, but instead Clark was blindly hostile to them, convinced that if they "faded in Quebec their supporters would find a new home with the Conservatives." He was wrong, of course. In the 1980 federal election, they actually voted for the Liberals - "a party more deeply rooted in French-Canadian society than the Conservatives." (2)

But in his defense, he had no stomach for joining with a party that had become "a refuge for right-wing 'fringe' elements".

The party's nadir occurred in 1983 when its provincial vice-president, Jim Keegstra, was found guilty on charges of spreading hatred against Jews. By the early 1980s, Social Credit remained a power only in British Columbia. (1)

But there was a rumble.

1. Of Passionate Intensity: Right-Wing Populism and the Reform Party of Canada, By Trevor Harrison, University of Toronto Press, 1995. ISBN: 0-8020-7204-6, Pg. 33-38

2. The Patriot Game: National Dreams and Political Realities, By Peter Brimelow, Key Porter Books, 1986, ISBN: 1-55013-001-3, Pg. 1

Words of Wisdom That Should Not Have Been Ignored

A CULTURE OF DEFIANCE: History of the Reform-Conservative Party of Canada

In 1965 a young reporter with the Calgary Albertan wrote a piece on the history of the Social Credit party in that province, which was then celebrating it's 30th anniversary.

Created during the depression, when desperate people were looking for a saviour, it was both a blessing and a curse. And this is what he discovered in interviewing those who were around at the time of it's creation. Reports were either glowing or painted a picture of "hooligans, emotion run amok, and a stab of fear."

In the churches, the country churches where so long there had been unity, Social Creditors sat on one side of the aisle, and others on the other, and there was a hostile silence after the service. (1)

And this was actually encouraged by the party. Divisive politics played out well at the ballot box. And so did fear.

Meetings of the opposition were often disrupted by " a 'group of big fellows' who honked car horns, yelled and pounded logs against the walls and doors of their meeting halls. Reporters were barred from [Social Credit] meetings, and often made to feel unsafe upon the streets." (1)
And on his Bible program, then leader William Aberhart regaled against "Henchmen", "Bigshots" and "those who betrayed Christ". And if critics phoned into his radio show, they were "threatened with tar and feather, shooting and physical violence". Religious fervour and politics can create a dangerous climate.

So when this young reporter sat down in 1965 to file his story, he understood the dangers of this kind of political party. His name was Joe Clark and he would go on to become Canada's youngest prime minister.

Yesterday, someone posted a CBC clip from the 2004 election campaign, on Canadians Rallying to Unseat Stephen Harper. In it Joe Clark suggested that former PCers (the party folded in 2003) should vote Liberal, and called Stephen Harper "a dangerous choice for voters".

Naturally the Reform/Alliance members, now marching under the 'Conservative' banner, went on the attack, suggesting that Clark was just upset because he was on his way out.

However, if the media had dug a little deeper, they would have understood that Clark was speaking from decades of research, and experience with this movement, that began in 1935 as Social Credit under first Aberhart, and then Ernest Manning. It then passed to Ernest's son Preston under Reform and Preston's lieutenant Stephen Harper under Alliance, before becoming the 'Conservative Party of Canada'.

He knew what they stood for. He knew how they operated. And he knew that Stephen Harper was a "dangerous" man.

Schooled in Politics

Joe Clark and Preston Manning attended the University of Alberta at the same time and were members of the Youth Parliament. At the time Manning was considered to be a little odd.

At university in the early sixties he gave the impression of a rural kid completely isolated from the ways of urban society. He presented an odd image. "He was part of the Youth Parliament's Social Credit caucus at the same time Joe Clark, Grant Notley (the late, former leader of the New Democratic Party in Alberta), Jim Coutts (who became prominent in the Liberal Party under Pierre Trudeau), and others were representing their respective parties. He was a good speaker, but you never saw him on campus. People knew who he was, and the rumour was that his father didn't want him to hang around the university too much because it would be a bad moral influence on him," recalls Fred Walker, a student at that time. "He looked very out of place — odd enough in his mannerisms and physical appearance and dress to be the occasional subject of ridicule. He gave the impression of being a very serious and committed young man — but more an apologist for his father's party and policies. He didn't play a very prominent role." (2)

But during debate it was clear that his political thought was not only to the right, but also, like his father's, grounded in a fear of socialism.

"It was not simply that Social Credit was found ... to be wanting in areas of social policy - it was more that conservative ideas were being challenged by socialism. Left-wing thinking was influencing events and people ... 'We [socreds] believe that Canada is drifting towards socialism even when the majority of Canadians are opposed to collectivism and the welfare state...'" (3)

The idea that the majority of Canadians opposed the welfare state, came from party rhetoric, and was not based on fact, a pattern that continues today.

What Canadians wanted was more from their government. If they were expected to go to war in the name of nationalism, then they deserved to share in the resources of the nation that they had fought for.

After the war, public policy launched upon a prolonged process of social reform. It was as though the generation that had endured the Depression and fought the war had determined upon the establishment of a new Canadian society based upon compassion and caring and a gathered resolve that life could be made better for all Canadians by governments committed to principles of tolerance, fairness, and equity. (4)

They Meet Again

After the Reform Party was founded, Preston Manning decided to run against his old university nemesis Joe Clark in the riding of Yellowhead Alberta, for the 1988 election. This wasn't so much because of a personal grudge, but he felt that the publicity would be good for the party. With Mr. Clark's status, the press would be following this race closely.

There is a funny story about that campaign from author Gordon Laird.

"Like many Albertans Preston Manning knows how to dress cowboy ... Manning learned how to ride on his parent's farm near Edmonton where he once won northern Alberta's 4H livestock raising championship .... but it was not until 1988 that Reform's head cowboy formed his first posse. Campaigning against the incumbent Progressive Conservative, Joe Clark ... Reform's new leader hatched a publicity stunt before a debate in the town of Jasper. A 'Reform Posse' of riders, complete with Reform banners and saddle blankets, was organized to chase down the ex-prime minister, who was scheduled to arrive at the local train station. It was High Noon for Mulroney's token westerner. 'The posse and Sheriff Manning were in pursuit of the notorious Joe Clark' ....

"To the disappointment of the fifteen horses and riders looking for a political lynchin', Clark never showed; his train was delayed. The Reformers still had fun handing out 'Wanted' posters and posing for pictures with tourists ..." (5)

Manning lost and he lost soundly.

A New Party and a New Nemesis

From the time that Stephen Harper was made the leader of the Alliance Party, he started a war against Joe Clark and the Conservatives. He didn't try to negotiate an alliance but told Clark to "stop pissing around or get out of my way." He wanted to devour the PC party and Clark fought back.

This prompted an abuse of his franking privileges, when Harper sent out letters to PC party members suggesting that Clark was misleading his party.

And when Joe Clark fought desperately to hold onto what was started by Sir John A. MacDonald, never joining the "new" neoconservative spin-off, he knew exactly who Stephen Harper was, and he knew what this party represented.

Former PC member of parliament , Flora MacDonald called it "... the demolition of a historic 150-year-old institution that has done so much to build this country... and claimed that "The party's future lies not in some right-wing alliance that would violate the progressive and moderate traditions of its former leaders, but with a renewed emphasis on the values that the great majority of Canadians feel represent their views." (5 )

So when in 2004, Joe Clark called Stephen Harper "dangerous", it was not based on sour grapes, but on decades of fighting against a destructive movement, that promoted divisiveness, was run by "hooligans, emotion run amok, with a stab of fear."

Canadians should have listened.

Sources:

1. A Desperate People Turn to Social Credit, By Reporter Joe Clark, Calgary Albertan News Perspective, August 1965

2. Preston Manning and the Reform Party, By Murray Dobbin, Goodread Biographies/Formac Publishing, 1992, ISBN: 0-88780-161-7, pg. 5

3. Dobbin, 1992, Pg. 24-25

4. Whose Country is This Anyway? By Dalton Camp, Douglas & McIntyre, 1995, ISBN: 1-55054-467-5, Pg. 17

5. The Toronto Star, November 14, 2003

When Stephen Harper "United the Right", He Solidified the Centre. Just Not For Himself.

A CULTURE OF DEFIANCE: History of the Reform-Conservative Party of Canada

How Stephen Harper became a "Tory" is the stuff of legend. Or more accurately, the stuff of fairy tales. He did have a brief stint with the PCs in the early 80's, but left the Party because they weren't right-wing enough.

The fact is, that the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada was not really right-wing at all, at least not in heart and soul. They were just right of centre. And they were 100% Canadian. And in many ways, historically, they were not unlike the Liberal Party in terms of policy.*

That doesn't mean that there weren't fierce rivalries. They were like two football teams (I don't want to use hockey because Harper has done that to death) who battle each other for the prize, but at the end of the day, both teams are in the same league, and committed to the game.

And while they both went after the same prize, the team that won it, honoured it. Showed it off and protected it for the next winner, whether it be themselves or their opponents.

They didn't win it, then smash it, to make sure that no one else could have it. That's how I see the Reformers, whether calling themselves Social Credit, Reform, Alliance or Conservative. They are the party that wants to smash the trophy and terminate the league.

Uniting the Right Was Not About Vote-Splitting

The common belief was that the PCs and Reform-Alliance joined forces to avoid splitting the vote. Sounds good but completely false. That's the way it was sold when David Frum arranged a meeting between Jean Charest then head of the PCs, and Preston Manning, then head of Reform.

In terms of bridging the differences between the parties of Preston Manning and Jean Charest, the conference made little headway ... the chasm in terms of the egos and pride of the leaders; the different attitudes that the parties have towards populist initiatives; Reform's origins in western alienation, Social Credit, and religious fundamentalism; and the fact that Reform emerged in part as an angry protest against the policies of a Progressive Conservative government made a rapprochement unlikely. (1)

A later report by Laurence Putnam confirmed the divide.

The first misconception about the Reform movement is that it is a conservative party. The Reform party has all the characteristics of a Western populist party and very few marks of a conservative party. (2)

And as to the myth of avoiding vote-splitting. In the West, many of those who voted PC did not go to Reform. Most of Reform's gain was at the expense of the NDP, another party that started out as a Western protest movement. But many also went to the Liberals.

Since the 2000 election, unity activists in both the PC and Canadian Alliance parties have preached that the PC party lost a major part of its family when the Reform Party rose to prominence, however, this is not exactly true. The PC Party did not experience a mutiny, but rather with the decline of the PC Party in Western Canada, an opportunity was extended for a new crew, the Reform movement, to come to power. In fact, many members of the Reform Party elected in 1993 had never been Conservatives at all. Preston Manning had been a member of the federal Social Credit Party prior to incepting the Reform Party. MPs Diane blonczy, Deborah Grey and Val Meredith were never members of the PC Party ... As these members were not Tories throughout the 1980's and early 1990's when the Tories were at their most successful peak since Sir John A. Macdonald ... (2)

Promoters of unity between the PC and Canadian Alliance parties had argued that if there were either only a PC or CA candidate in your average Ontario riding, they would have beat the Liberals in 2000. But what about Etobicoke North? In 2000, no PC candidate ran in Etobicoke North, but a Canadian Alliance candidate did, and yet they gained only 3.9%, and the majority of the PC votes migrated to the Liberal candidate. This despite the fact that provincially, the identical riding was held by PC M.P.P. John Hastings.

This riding is one example that proves 1+1 doesn't necessarily equal 2 when it comes to defeating a Liberal incumbent in Ontario ridings. Another interesting Ontario result was found in the riding of Markham, where Jim Jones was elected as a Progressive Conservative in 1997. Mr. Jones crossed to the Alliance in the summer of 2000, but lost re-election just months later. Why was Mr. Jones electable to the people of Markham, Ontario, as a Tory, but unelectable as a Canadian Alliance M.P.? (2)

It's because the majority of the Canadian electorate are moderates. The same people who voted for Brian Mulroney later voted for Jean Chretien, illustrating that votes between the Liberals and the PC Party were always liquid, while votes cast for ideologically-driven parties, like Reform/Alliance and NDP**, came from a "base".

The Reform movement only became palpable to Canadians when they shed their wolf's clothing and started calling themselves "Conservative", or worse yet "Tories", cashing in on a century and a half tradition. And for awhile, they were able to fool some of the people some of the time. But unfortunately for them, as their policies became increasingly un-Canadian, their level of support has drifted back to their "base".

They have no hope of drawing votes from the NDP, except perhaps in the West, but they are also losing the votes of moderates ... aka: ordinary Canadians.

So now they have a problem. Instead of eliminating what they thought was their own competition, they have eliminated all competition for the centre, and all of the "liquid" votes are now flowing away from them.

They are a right-wing fringe party. Nothing more. They came, they saw, they scared the hell out of us, and now they must leave.

This brings us to Michael Ignatieff. I see him as the perfect leader to unite the centre. And if I wasn't convinced before, a column by the widow of the late PC president Dalton Camp, has me sold. Ignatieff is not "a bleeding heart Liberal" but will lead a party that will be fiscally responsible but socially aware.

His family has a long history in this country, and come from all political stripes. His G-Grandfather, George Munro Grant helped Sir John A. and Confederation, and later promoted his railway. His uncle George Parkin Grant was also a Conservative, and author of the popular Lament for a Nation, as reaction to the defeat of John Diefenbaker. His fear was that we would become too Americanized and too beholden to corporations, and while this book was reactionary, he would later suggest that he felt that Pierre Trudeau was on the right track. (3)

Michael's father George Ignatieff was a foreign secretary under Diefenbaker, Diplomat under Pearson, and even served as acting president of the United Nations General Assembly***. He was also a peace activist, who fought hard against nuclear weapons, earning him a reputation as a "Peacemonger." (4)

Another uncle was Vincent Massey.

And though Michael Ignatieff's political views are his own, they have been nurtured in the true Canadian tradition.

So while Johannes Wheeldon may ask "Can Iggy Find His Centre?" He didn't have to. He was already there. And as Wendy Camp says: "He has come home to us." And whispering in his ear, will be family voices from the past, making sure that he doesn't screw up what they helped to build.

Footnotes:

*Stephen Harper referred to the PCs or "Red Tories" as "Pink Liberals".

**The NDP has since become more moderate and appealing, though some of their early followers feel that they had to sell out to do so. I like them and remember the greats like Tommy Douglas and Ed Broadbent, and the leader Jack Layton used to be.

***Stephen Harper and the Reformers never trusted the United Nations.

Sources:

1. The Winds of Right-wing Change in Canadian Journalism, By David Taras (University of Calgary), Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 21, No 4, 1996

2. An Analysis On The Differences Between the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada & The Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance, by Laurence Putnam As prepared for the Fraser Institute, December 2002

3. Lament For a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism, By George P. Grant, McClelland & Stewart, 1970 edition with new introduction by author.

4. The Making of a Peacemonger: The Memoirs of George Ignatieff, By Sonja Sinclair, University of Toronto Press, ISBN: 0-8020-2556-0

Tony Panayi Continued: Tory Youth and Right-Wing Politics

A CULTURE OF DEFIANCE: History of the Reform-Conservative Party of Canada

When Anthony Panayi entered the University of Toronto, he had reinvented himself as Tony Clement, and was ready to inflict his Reagan/Thatcher adoration on the University's Tory Youth.

What he lacked in physical stature, he made up for with enthusiasm, and through aggressive marketing and the help of cohorts, he accomplished his goal, building up the campus Tories to almost 500 members.

With strength in numbers they were ready to take on the world of federal politics, and the timing couldn't be better.

Brian Mulroney was in the process of trying to reinvent himself as a man of the people. During the 1976 leadership convention, he had aligned himself with people like Conrad Black and Paul Desmaris of the Power Corporation, running a glitzy, in your face, campaign. His opposition was able to paint him as an "elitist" and he lost the race as a result.

But by 1983, he had learned his lesson, and gone were the Cadillacs and lavish posters. He was going to be a man of the people, opting to travel around in an old Plymouth, fly economy, and dress down his campaign office.

His campaign manager, Peter White, also saw the potential in veering away from the progressive side of the party and tapping into the vote rich right-wing. So Mulroney's rhetoric had already changed to reflect things like lower taxes, balanced budgets and a free market economy.(1)

But White had also discovered a gold mine in a group of neoconservative youth from the University of Toronto, led by Anthony Panayi Clement.

The campus radicals were also instrumental in the defeat of federal Conservative leader Joe Clark by corporate lawyer Brian Mulroney. "In 1981 to '83 there was a guerrilla campaign against the leadership of Joe Clark orchestrated by Brian Mulroney and the people who backed Mulroney," says Campbell. "In Ontario, the PC campus and youth associations were all hotbeds of anti-Clark activity and we were all on the anti-Clark side." The success of the right young Tories in helping force a leadership convention and in electing Mulroney over Clark strengthened their confidence. (2)

The Young Conservatives had also claimed a victory in 1982, at the Ontario Policy Convention.

They had been upset with the expansion of the Ontario Human Rights Code, under premier William Davis, seeing it as an intrusion of the state. So, led by Tom Long, who had cut his political teeth campaigning for Ronald Reagan (3), "... the young Tories tried to force a debate on the issue at a party policy convention. The senior guard warned the young rebels to tone it down; policy conventions were no place to debate policy. But the campaign continued, and faced with the prospect of an ugly public fight, the leadership compromised. Representatives of the youth wing were allowed to help draft the wording of the final resolution on amending the code at the convention. "It wasn't perfect," says Clement, "but it was something we could live with." (2)

But their work for Brian Mulroney would turn out to be perfect, as he had a landslide victory in 1984, winning the largest majority government in Canadian history.

Another Young Conservative Goes to Ottawa



At the time there was another Young Conservative who was helping to boost the fortunes of Brian Mulroney. Then going by the name Steve, he and his girlfriend, Cynthia Williams, volunteered in the offices of Jim Hawkes, Progressive Conservative MP for Calgary West.

Already a member of the National Citizens Coalition, he too had begun to adopt radical right-wing views and a zeal to see them put into practice.

"At the [town hall] meeting they were among the few young people in attendance ... Steve in particular was disgusted with the Liberal government ... My recall is that he did not know very much about the organized political party aspect of politics ... he had concerns about the policy part of politics. They [Steve and Cynthia] joined the association. Then the next thing I knew, they were working within my riding association as volunteers, and members of the executive." (4)

Harper and his girlfriend would help out with Jim Hawke's campaign and recruited many young members from the University of Calgary, where he was studying economics. One of those was a young man named John Weissenberger, who introduced him to the neo-conservative policies of William F. Buckley.

When Harper joined Jim Hawkes in Ottawa as his legislative assistant, Weissenberger looked after things on the local front. However, after working with Hawkes on UI reform (UI, Unemployment Insurance was the forerunner to EI), that never materialized, he became disillusioned and returned to school in Calgary. In a later speech at the founding of the Reform Party, Harper would call for end to "... government financial involvement in the unemployment insurance system..." (5)

But this would not mean the end of politics for Steve Harper. After leaving Jim Hawke's office in 1986, he enrolled in the University of Calgary's master's program, and came to the attention of Robert Mansell with the school of economics. Mansell had been an opponent of Pierre Trudeau's National Energy Program, and saw in young Steve, an ally. So he encourage him to come to an assembly where there was going to be the discussion of creating a new national party, centred in the West, that would be dedicated to advancing western policies.

The keynote speaker was a man by the name of Preston Manning. After they met, Steve caught the bug and began to ...

... network with some of the conservative think-tanks, such as the National Citizens Coalition and the Fraser Institute, trying to mobilize some of the conservative resources, and also helped to establish a right-wing organization, the Northern Foundation." (6)

The wheels were in motion for a right-wing revolution.

Tony Panyi Continued: A Shake Up in the Legislature

Sources:

1. Mulroney: The Politics of Ambition, By John Sawatsky, MacFarlane, Walter & Ross, 1991, ISBN: 0-921912-06-04, Pg. 471-472

2. Promised Land: Inside the Mike Harris Revolution, By John Ibbitson, 1997, ISBN: 0136738648, Pg. 33

3. Tom Long: Dead wrong for PCs: CCRAP hopeful "Callow, shallow, glib", By Scott Piatkowski, Winnipeg Free Press, 2000

4. Stephen Harper and the Future of Canada, by William Johnson, McClelland & Stewart, 2005, ISBN 0-7710 4350-3, 2005, Pg. 14

5. Of Passionate Intensity: Right-Wing Populism and the Reform Party of Canada, By Trevor Harrison, University of Toronto Press, 1995, ISBN: 0-8020-7204-6 3, Pg. 116

6. Harrison, 1995, Pg. 110

The Creation of Stephen Harper's Sandbox

A CULTURE OF DEFIANCE: History of the Reform-Conservative Party of Canada

The creation of the Alliance party was the result of efforts by three neoconservative parties: The federal Reform Party, Ralph Klein's Alberta and Mike Harris' Ontario. The creation of the Conservative Party of Canada, came about through a hostile takeover of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada.

And though there were many warnings about the outcome of a neoconservative takeover, we didn't listen.

The wonderful Dalton Camp, a longtime conservative insider, opposed the notion completely. When he first learned of the attempt to unite the right he was livid, claiming that the conservatism of Stockwell Day "is viewed by most Tories as embedded in the lunatic fringe." (1)

But I think Frances Russel of the Winnipeg Free Press said it best. She felt that this was not going to be a "big tent" party as many were suggesting, but rather a sandbox.

One week into the launch of the latest "great right hope" and the portents are perilous for those who seek a "big tent" party capable of unseating the governing Liberals. So far, the proponents of a united right are making it clear they aren't interested in giving a real option to Canadians. They are only interested in fashioning their own little sandbox where they can play their own narrow ideological games.

Mr. Manning was positively giddy in his article in yesterday's Free Press. He thinks he's finally realized the dream he and his father put into book form back in 1967, the dream to create a party of ideologically pure social and economic conservatism to confront "the collectivist welfare state" that disregards "individual liberties and
responsibilities" and is an affront to "personal salvation."

Moderates within the Progressive Conservative Party must act quickly to ameliorate the harsh, hard-right image of the new party before it solidifies in the public's mind. The Harrises, the Mannings, the Longs -- and the Stephen Harpers -- are not living in political reality. (2)

And she was right, because the only way that Harper has been able to sell neoconservatism to Canada has been to operate in the shadows. Or as his former right-hand man Tom Flanagan once suggested, "fooling Canadians into thinking you're moving to the left when you're not". (3)

Senator Lowell Murray wrote a piece for the Globe and Mail urging Peter MacKay to reconsider.

Stephen Harper called last week for an "electoral coalition" between the Progressive Conservative and Canadian Alliance parties. If our party's leader, Peter MacKay, goes down this road -- and he seems tempted to explore it -- he will waste precious time and political capital. And he will find it's a dead end.

... The fact is that the two parties are fundamentally different. That they are incompatible would soon become clear to Tory candidates trying to defend Alliance policies, and vice versa, in the unstable electoral cohabitation proposed by Mr. Harper and others. Reform conservatism, which is what the Alliance practises, relies on people's fear of moral and economic decline combined with nostalgia for a Canada that no longer exists. It spoils all the good arguments for the market economy by making a religion of it, pretending there are market criteria and market solutions to all our social and political problems. (4)

And even Norman Spector called it the 'Kiss of Death':

Stephen Harper wants to make "common cause" with newly elected Tory leader Peter MacKay in order to throw the Liberal rascals out of office. The Alliance leader says voters expect the two parties to present a single slate of candidates in the next election.

That's eyewash: Most Canadians -- including out here in British Columbia, where the Alliance traditionally elects the plurality of its MPs -- expect Paul Martin to be their next prime minister. They'd be appalled if Tory/Alliance backroom boys and girls came together to carve up the country for political gain. In truth, the proposal is largely tactical, a cleverly designed kiss of death for the Tories. (5)

What we now have is a sandbox, where Stephen Harper and his schoolyard bullies play their ideological little games, and for anyone who disapproves, they can expect to have sand thrown in their face or get a wedgie from hell.

It took Marci McDonald's book, the Armageddon factor (6), for us to realize what has happened to our country. The American Religious Right has accomplished in four years, what it took them thirty years to do their own country. But they couldn't have done it without willing accomplices, a sleeping electorate and the complete lack of an independent media.

And I don't mean that they have turned us into a 'Christian' nation, though a theocracy is definitely on the horizon.

We've been neo-conned, and I suspect we're about to find out just how painful that really is, as we are now on the verge of losing everything that once identified our country. And unless we can convince the parties on the left to unite for the common good, there may be no turning back.

"When I get through with Canada, you won't recognize it". Stephen Harper

That may be the only time he's ever told the truth, because I barely recognize it now.

Sources:

1. Hard Right Turn: The New Face of Neo-Conservatism in Canada, Brooke Jeffrey, Harper-Collins, 1999, ISBN: 0-00 255762-2, Pg. 381

2. Watch for a purge of Red Tories, by Frances Russell, Winnipeg Free Press, 24 October, 2003

3. The Man Behind Stephen Harper, The new Conservative Party has tasted success and wants majority rule, By Marci McDonald, Walrus Magazine, October 2004

4. Don't do it, Peter: There is no good reason for Tories to climb into bed with the Alliance
by Senator Lowell Murray, Globe and Mail, June 23, 2003

5. An Alliance kiss of death: The Tories should call Stephen Harper's bluff by proposing a common platform for the next election, by Norman Spector, Globe and Mail, June 25, 2003

6. The Armageddon Factor: The Rise of Christian Nationalism in Canada, By: Marci McDonald, Random House Canada, 2010, ISBN: 978-0-307-35646-8 3